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NO. 51 DECEMBER 2019  Introduction 
Aung San Suu Kyi at the 
International Court of Justice 
The Gambia’s Genocide Case against Myanmar and Its Domestic Ramifications 
Angshuman Choudhury and Felix Heiduk 
The recent decision by The Gambia to file a genocide case against Myanmar at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has directed international attention again towards 
Rakhine State in western Myanmar, where the Rohingya people have faced discrimi-
nation and persecution for decades. What took many observers by surprise was the 
announcement by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi that she would be travelling to 
The Hague to personally “defend the national interest” and thus, by extension, the 
actions of her former nemesis. After all, she had enjoyed broad international support 
precisely for her role as leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and her 
democratic, non-violent opposition against the military dictatorship. These develop-
ments, we argue, must be understood against a wider rollback of the democratisation 
process. The rollback is at least partly being orchestrated by Aung San Suu Kyi and 
the NLD, and it could bode ill especially for the ethnic minorities in the country. 
 
The Gambia, on behalf of the Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation, has filed a case at 
the ICJ accusing Myanmar of committing 
genocide against the Rohingya minority. 
The case asks the ICJ to urgently order 
measures to stop Myanmar’s genocidal con-
duct immediately. The Rohingya, a major-
ity-Muslim ethnic group regarded by the 
government and the army as “Bengali”, or 
illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, have 
long faced discrimination and persecution. 
Recently, military-led campaigns against 
Rohingya communities in October 2016 
and August 2017 had caused nearly 800,000 
Rohingya to flee the country. The armed 
forces, as well as the civilian government of 
Myanmar, have claimed that military opera-
tions took place only in direct response 
to terrorist attacks by an armed group, the 
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), 
and that they were fully proportionate 
to the security threat posed. The United 
Nations (UN), however, has labelled the 
operations as ethnic cleansing campaigns 
involving mass rape, widespread killings of 
civilians, torture, and the frequent burning 
of Rohingya villages. Furthermore, a UN 
Fact-Finding Mission last year labelled the 
Tatmadaw’s (armed forces) anti-Rohingya 
violence as “genocidal”. Under intense 
international scrutiny, the government has, 
in principle, agreed in 2018 to allow the 
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return of Rohingya refugees to improve its 
tainted international image. However, two 
attempts to repatriate at least some of the 
estimated more than one million Rohingya 
refugees have failed. The Rohingya refugees 
refused to participate in the repatriation 
efforts for fears over their physical safety. 
Additionally, a recent think-tank report has 
found that Myanmar has made only mini-
mal preparations to facilitate the return 
of Rohingyas to their ancestral villages in 
Rakhine in terms of food, security, or shel-
ter. More so, a UN Human Rights Council 
report released a few weeks ago indicates 
that the situation of the Rohingya who 
have remained in Myanmar is as dire as 
ever. The report details continuing abuses 
by the state security forces, prevailing im-
punity of those involved in human rights 
violations, and concludes that the remain-
ing Rohingya in Myanmar are still at “seri-
ous risk of genocide” as the government 
“continues to harbor genocidal intent”. 
Thus, various governments and international 
organisations have approved of the decision 
by The Gambia to file a case at the ICJ. 
Reactions Inside the Country 
So far, the domestic political community 
and civil society in Myanmar have staunchly 
opposed international interventions on the 
Rohingya crisis. The dominant narrative 
emerging from the ruling party and the Tat-
madaw, as also reflected in popular narra-
tives, is that outside actors do not under-
stand the “reality” on the ground. There is 
also a pushback against external investiga-
tive mechanisms based on the belief that 
the international community has ignored 
the terrorist violence unleashed by ARSA 
and focussed disproportionately on the Tat-
madaw’s actions. However, the reaction to 
the ICJ case has been somewhat different. 
The civilian government has acknowl-
edged The Gambia’s case at the ICJ as valid, 
while flagging it as “an issue of high national 
interest affecting all nationals of Myan-
mar”. As a UN Member State and State Party 
to the Genocide Convention of 1948, Myan-
mar has no other option but to accept the 
Court’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, Myanmar 
had made two reservations while ratifying 
the Convention in 1956, but none in Article 
IX, which The Gambia has based its case on. 
However, the government has noted that 
the case (alongside the International Crimi-
nal Court and Argentine cases) has “severely 
damaged” Myanmar’s international image. 
It has also argued that Myanmar is as reso-
lute about preventing genocide as it was 
when signing the 1948 Convention. The gov-
ernment has formed a “Special Unit on In-
ternational Criminal Justice” and it is clear 
that Naypyitaw is taking the case seriously 
and hopes to put up a watertight defence 
before the Court. Furthermore, the State 
Counsellor has been appointed as “the agent” 
of Myanmar in her capacity as the Foreign 
Minister, effectively putting her as the lead 
defender. Suu Kyi’s appointment is being 
widely seen as a valiant attempt to defend 
the dignity of Myanmar before the inter-
national community, with members of the 
mainstream political community and civil 
society lauding her leadership. 
The military’s response has been similar. 
Despite rejecting all accusations of geno-
cidal violence made by the international 
community so far, it has acknowledged the 
ICJ case and announced that it would fully 
cooperate with the government on the 
issue. The military’s position of acceptance 
also comes from unavoidable boundaries 
of international law. It does not wish to be 
seen as being blatantly dismissive of the in-
ternational legal system, but it has projected 
the case as a chance to tell the “reality” – 
or its own version – of the Rakhine story 
to the international community. It main-
tains that the Rohingya are “illegal immi-
grants” from Bangladesh and are respon-
sible for the violence in northern Rakhine. 
Further, the Tatmadaw is letting the civilian 
government take the lead on the case. 
The reactions of the Ethnic Armed 
Organisations (EAOs) towards The Gambia’s 
case have been mixed. The United Wa State 
Army (UWSA), the National Democratic 
Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Shan State 
Progressive Party have backed the govern-
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ment. All three are non-signatories to the 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). 
The 10 NCA signatories have not announced 
any uniform position yet. However, a Karen 
National Union central executive commit-
tee member told the media that he sup-
ports the government and appealed to other 
ethnic minorities to do so. Separately, a 
section of the Karen diaspora, under the 
banner of the Worldwide Karen Organisa-
tion, has declared its support for the ICJ 
case. Furthermore, the Arakan Army, the 
Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance 
Army have supported the ICJ case. They 
are part of the Northern Alliance, a group-
ing of non-signatory EAOs that is currently 
at war with the Tatmadaw. The ICJ case 
could discredit the Tatmadaw, which is 
exactly what these warring EAOs seek. How-
ever, groups such as the UWSA and the 
NDAA have control over autonomous en-
claves and are not at war with the Tatma-
daw, which explains their support for the 
government. 
Why Aung San Suu Kyii Is 
Going to The Hague 
This is not the first time that Suu Kyi is 
defending the Tatmadaw’s controversial 
actions against the Rohingya at an inter-
national forum. She has done so many 
times since the first wave of violence in 
northern Rakhine erupted in October 2016. 
By personally going to The Hague to 
defend Myanmar, Suu Kyi will be able to 
accrue significant political gains at home in 
two distinct aspects. 
First, national elections will be held next 
year, with Suu Kyi’s party, the NLD, defend-
ing its ruling position. Although the NLD 
remains popular in majority Burman con-
stituencies, it has lost traction in minority 
ethnic areas due to various factors, such as 
the emergence of new parties, renewed 
armed conflict, and clampdowns on ethnic 
activists. Even among its majority Burman 
constituencies in central Myanmar, the NLD 
faces headwinds. In this context, Suu Kyi’s 
decision to lead the defence at the ICJ can 
rejuvenate the NLD’s political fortunes 
while boosting her own image before the 
domestic audience. By framing it as a 
“national interest” issue, she has already 
restricted the space for political opponents, 
including from smaller ethnic parties, 
to criticise her. Thus, she now stands to 
emerge as a unifying figure. Consequently, 
the NLD is not just retaining its existing 
voter base, but it will also end up expand-
ing it before next year’s elections. 
Second, by defending charges of geno-
cide that are essentially directed at the Tat-
madaw, Suu Kyi stands to gain some politi-
cal leverage over the military. This is particu-
larly crucial in light of the ongoing process 
of constitutional amendment, which the 
NLD initiated last year and wants to push 
through before the 2020 elections. Amend-
ing the military-drafted 2008 constitution 
was one of the NLD’s key election promises 
in 2015. However, for the military, which 
derives all of its political authority from the 
constitution, the process is an existential 
threat. This has sharpened tensions be-
tween both camps, casting a shadow over 
the stability of Myanmar’s nascent democ-
racy. By shielding the military at the ICJ, 
Suu Kyi might be able to convince the Tat-
madaw to relax their parliamentary vetoes 
and allow some of the amendments to pass 
in the parliament. For the State Counsellor, 
the provision that bars her from becoming 
the union’s President because of her British 
family is of particular importance. Most im-
portantly, with the military publicly declar-
ing its support for the government, the 
whole case could help stabilise civil-mili-
tary relations in Myanmar, both in practice 
and popular perception. 
Outlook: Domestic Ramifications 
After the NLD landslide victory in 2015, 
which made Suu Kyi the de facto head of 
the new, democratically elected govern-
ment, Western observers expected democ-
racy would at last prevail. However, demo-
cratic reforms have come much more slowly 
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than expected. This is in part due to the 
2008 military-drafted constitution, which 
safeguards most of the armed forces’ wide-
ranging prerogatives. It enables the military 
to appoint the ministers of defence, home 
affairs, and border affairs. It also enables 
the military to assume power over all 
branches of the government in case of a 
state of emergency. It furthermore reserves 
25 per cent of the seats in both houses of 
parliament for the security forces and stipu-
lates that amending the Constitution re-
quires the approval of more than 75 per 
cent of all lawmakers – thereby effectively 
granting the military veto powers over any 
constitutional changes. As it stands, the 
civilian government has almost no leverage 
over the armed forces. However, it is not 
just the armed forces that are to blame for 
the slow pace of democratic reforms. De-
spite holding a majority of seats in parlia-
ment, the NLD government has nonetheless 
struggled to reform the country over the 
last four years. Failure to prevent, or at least 
speak up against, the mass atrocities against 
the Rohingya has internationally been the 
most visible indicator of this. Yet, Suu Kyi’s 
autocratic leadership style, her diffidence 
towards upcoming political talent, and the 
lack of intra-party democracy in the NLD, 
as well as the failure to decentralise Myan-
mar’s polities and politics, have also been 
widely criticised. Military-era laws were 
used by the NLD government to stifle public 
expressions of dissent and to silence the 
media from reporting stories critical of the 
armed forces and the government. In addi-
tion, the peace process with ethnic armed 
groups has stalled and further conflict has 
broken out, business confidence remains 
low, and for many Burmese, living con-
ditions have yet to improve. In recent 
by-elections, the NLD had a relatively poor 
showing, losing seats to the military-backed 
Union Solidarity and Development Party 
and to ethnic parties. Yet, as Suu Kyi re-
mains hugely popular among the ethnic 
Burman majority of the population, very 
few predict anything but an outright elec-
toral victory of the NLD in 2020. 
That being said, the ICJ case might turn 
out to be a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it has led to intensified scrutiny on 
the atrocities committed by the security 
forces in Rakhine, and by extension on 
those committed against other ethnic 
minorities. It will thereby help those who 
aim to further internationalise the issue. 
On the other hand, however, there is little 
reason to assume the case will alter the 
government’s stance on the Rohingya issue 
or on other ethnic minorities. With the 
2020 elections looming ever larger on the 
horizon, Suu Kyi will likely face off against 
the current army commander, Min Aung 
Hlaing, and military-backed parties. One 
can infer from her recent rhetoric that she 
will try to appear as tough and nationalist 
as possible on the campaign trail, while at 
the same time refraining from incensing 
the military. Her announcement to “defend 
the national interest” in The Hague has not 
only further boosted her image domestically, 
but also indicates a further hardening of 
her stance on minority rights. What it there-
fore highlights is not so much salience of 
the 2020 elections for her supporters, but 
also the alienation of the ethnic minorities, 
who make up more than 30 per cent of the 
total population. The increasing alienation 
of minority groups is most visible in Rakhine 
State, where both the ethnic Rohingya and 
ethnic Rakhine – the latter make up the 
majority of the population in the state – 
feel disillusioned about the current state of 
affairs. The same goes for the Karen in the 
south-east and the Kachin in the north. If 
Suu Kyi and her rivals go on a nationalist 
overdrive as the ICJ case drags on, national 
reconciliation and Myanmar’s decentralisa-
tion might be at risk. However, if the Suu 
Kyi government decides to reach out to the 
minorities so as to fix Myanmar’s inter-
national image, then the whole case might 
strengthen the country’s emergent democ-
racy. 
Angshuman Choudhury is a GIBSA Visiting Fellow at SWP and a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict 
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